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Arthex, Inc. and the Assault on Administrative
Adjudication
TRADEMARK & UNFAIR COMPETITION
BY BRIAN WOHLHIETER/ ON APRIL 26, 2021
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Last month, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments for a case called Arthrex, Inc. v. United
States which could have a significant impact on the world of patents but, even more
profoundly, on the whole of the administrative state. The argument presented by the lower
court is that Administrative Patent Judges (APJs) of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB)
wield too much power to not be approved by Senate confirmation. Rather than requiring
appointment, the Federal Circuit decided to subordinate the APJs to political directors by
stripping them of employment protections which are instituted to ensure the crucial Due
Process protections of patent holders. The Federal Circuit’s analysis and remedy did not come
out of left field. They were the inevitable product of decades of unitary executive theory 1 and
skepticism towards the administrative state.
The judicial grounding for much of this skepticism can be found in a string of cases in the late
20th century which established the standard by which to judge executive officers. This history

begins with the cases of Morrison v. Olson and Edmond v. United States decided in 1988 and
1997, respectively, which led to the slightly amorphous and currently applied standard of
examining factors such as the officer’s level of supervision by a principal officer, 2 the
reviewability of the officer’s work,3 whether the officer is removable at will versus for
cause,4 and the scope of the officer’s duties.5 According to the Federal Circuit in Arthrex, Inc.,
“[t]hese factors are strong indicators of the level of control and supervision appointed officials
have over the officers and their decision-making on behalf of the Executive Branch. . . [which
is] the central consideration.”6
Since those decisions, the independence and appointment of officers within the Executive
Branch have continued to be targets of judicial scrutiny. There has been a recent string of
decisions which have found that the executive power vested in the President has been
unconstitutionally distributed to other members of the Executive Branch or limited in such a
way that the President may not “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” 78 In parallel
with this pattern of increased scrutiny towards executive oversight, there is increased scrutiny
of the officers who exercise the power of the Executive Branch.9 One particular locus of
concern in this area has been the adjudicatory officers10 of the Executive Branch.
Part of this increased scrutiny may be due in part to the fact that, in the past decade, there has
been a great increase in the number of administrative law judges (ALJs) and the activity of
those judges across the entirety of the Executive Branch.11 The Dodd-Frank Act increased the
jurisdiction of, and granted more authority to, Security & Exchange Commission ALJs, which
led to a tripling in the number of adjudications against public companies from 2011 to
2016.12 The Social Security Administration, by far the largest employer of ALJs, has increased
the number of judges from about 1,100 to over 1,600 in the past decade.13The America Invents
Act passed in 2012 created the PTAB and the position of APJ, which now accounts for almost
200 officers.14
Each administrative adjudicator’s authority and jurisdiction within their respective
administration differs but the goal of Congress in creating them has remained the same:
creating adjudicative bodies within the administrative system, which retain subject matter
expertise and provide as neutral a body as possible for the fair administration of the law and
the protection of litigants’ Due Process rights.15 This is a noble goal and has allowed for
specialized tribunals that prevent the flood of cases that would otherwise be heard by the
more plenary and already overworked Article III courts. In the pursuit of this system, Congress
has afforded certain removal protections to the members of the adjudicative bodies in an
attempt to ensure impartiality by somewhat insulating them from the influence of their
superiors.16
Until recently, many of these ALJs were thought of as just employees, not officers, and were
therefore not subject to the Appointments Clause of the Constitution.17 However, the Supreme
Court struck a blow to this theory in the case of Lucia v. S.E.C when it found that ALJs within

the SEC were in fact inferior officers and required appointment by the President, a court of
law, or the head of a department.18 This decision sent many administrations scrambling to
correct any deficiencies in their own ALJ appointment process in order to protect the
constitutionality of their adjudicative bodies.19 For example, the Acting Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration, the largest employer of ALJs, worked quickly to reappoint them
herself in accordance with the Appointments Clause.20
The decisional creep21 has now set in and, in the case of Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc.,
the Federal Circuit has found that some of these adjudicative officers, specifically
Administrative Patent Judges of the PTAB, are in fact principal officers.22 This decision would
require the appointment of APJs by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate.23 The Federal Circuit found as such because, in the particular case of APJs, there is no
“presidentially-appointed officer who can review, vacate, or correct decisions by the APJs
combined with the limited removal power.”24 This decision was guided in part by a similar
finding by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright
Royalty Bd., which held that Copyright Royalty Judges, who are authorized to make final
decisions and had limitations on their removal, were also principal officers.25
In both cases, the respective courts did not defer to Congress for changes or maintain the
system put in place by Congress while requiring the proper appointment. Instead, the courts
chose a remedy which would ensure their designation as inferior officers.26 The remedy chosen
by both courts was severability of the statutory “for cause” protections of the administrative
judges, putting them more closely under the control of a presidentially-appointed officer of
the United States who would “constrain to a significant degree”27 their decision-making.
This language does not at all seem consistent with Congress’s goal of creating administrative
bodies capable of impartial adjudications that ensures the due process of law.28 However, the
courts found that it was “consistent with the intent of Congress” 29 because Congress “would
have preferred a Board whose members are removable at will rather than no Board at
all.”30 The Federal Circuit made no attempt at an analysis of Congressional intent other than
the above statement that reads more like a mob shakedown than well-reasoned insight. Even
if control of APJ decision-making by executive branch officers is seen as requisite for inferior
officer status, the remedy chosen by the Federal Circuit significantly undermines
Congressional intent and patent owners’ Due Process protections. There are other, less drastic,
remedies available that would be preferable in preserving Congress’s intent and sacred
constitutional protections. Within the coming months, we will see if the Supreme Court agrees
and if it can rise to the tall task of bringing more certainty to such a clouded area of the law.
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